STARTUP FINANCING STRUCTURES
One respected tracker says private credit defaults are at a record. Another says they are falling. Both can be right, and that is exactly the problem for anyone who lends to, invests in or borrows from this market, startups included.
Key takeaways
- Fitch’s US private credit default rate hit a record 6.3% for the year to Q3 2026; Proskauer’s index showed 2.41% and falling.
- The gap comes from different borrower samples and from counting amendments, deferrals and PIK as defaults or not.
- Credit secondaries reached $20.4B in H1 2026, and trades priced against real buyers are becoming the most useful signal.
Same Quarter, Different Story
At the end of October, two respected sources published their reads on US private credit for the third quarter of 2026.
Fitch Ratings reported that its US private credit default rate reached 6.3 percent for the twelve months to Q3, the highest reading on record, up from 6.0 percent in the prior quarter and higher every quarter since Q3 2025. Fitch counted 91 unique defaulting borrowers over that period.
A few days earlier, the law firm Proskauer released its own Private Credit Default Index, covering 746 senior secured and unitranche loans worth about $205.7 billion in original principal. Its default rate for the same quarter was 2.41 percent, down from 2.51 percent and the second consecutive quarterly decline.
One headline says record stress. The other says continued resilience. If you are an investor, a lender or a founder with a loan, which one describes your world?
Why Both Numbers Are Honest
Neither firm is wrong. They are measuring different things. Fitch’s universe includes many smaller companies, which have historically defaulted more often. Proskauer’s index tracks a defined set of senior loans and weights them by size, so larger and sturdier borrowers carry more of the result.
The bigger difference is definition. Fitch says most of its default events in Q3 came from stressed maturity extensions, interest deferrals and the introduction of payment in kind, or PIK, where a borrower pays interest with more debt instead of cash. In a public bond, those moves would be obvious and immediately priced. In private credit, they are often negotiated quietly between a borrower and a small group of lenders.
That is the defining feature of the asset class. Distress rarely arrives as a bankruptcy filing. It arrives as an amendment. Whether that amendment is a default depends on who is counting.
Neither approach is designed to mislead. But together they show how little the market can see. A lender holding a loan, an LP holding a fund and an analyst reading the headlines can all look at the same quarter and reach opposite conclusions about risk. In a market of this size, that kind of uncertainty is not a footnote. It is a cost that every participant pays, usually in the form of wider spreads, slower decisions and capital that sits on the sidelines.
Where Startups Come In
This matters well beyond leveraged buyouts. Over the past few years, startups have become heavy users of private credit through venture debt, revenue based loans and asset backed facilities. Those loans sit on the same kinds of balance sheets: credit funds, business development companies and specialty lenders.
When a growing company extends its maturity or switches to PIK interest to preserve cash, it is making a sensible operating decision. But on the lender’s side, that decision changes the value of an asset. One dataset may record it as a default. Another may record it as a routine workout. The loan’s official mark may not move at all.
For founders, the lesson is simple. Your loan is someone else’s asset, and increasingly that asset can be sold. For equity investors, it is a reminder to read the whole capital structure, because the terms and health of a company’s debt often tell you more about its runway than the last equity round.
The Secondary Market Is Waking Up
Fortunately, a better signal is emerging. Evercore reports that credit secondary volume reached $20.4 billion in the first half of 2026, up 122 percent from a year earlier and already above the total for all of 2025. GP-led deals, where managers move portfolios into new vehicles with new buyers, made up about 83 percent of that activity and priced at around 99 percent of fair market value on average.
Evercore also notes that redemption requests at non-traded BDCs tracked by Fitch rose more than sixfold since Q3 2025, and it expects BDCs and semi-liquid vehicles to supply about a quarter of credit secondary volume this year. Buyers, it says, are demanding granular borrower-level data before they bid, and about 81 percent of deals still run through intermediaries.
In other words, the market is starting to do what default indexes cannot. It is putting real money behind a view of what specific loans are worth.
A Price Is the Best Default Rate
Default statistics will always be backward looking and definition dependent. They tell you what happened to a sample. A transaction price tells you what a willing buyer believes about a specific asset today, with everything known at that moment built in.
That is why I think the next phase of private credit will be defined less by new default indexes and more by better pricing infrastructure: continuous price discovery built from actual secondary trades, discreet matching between sellers and vetted buyers who understand the underlying borrowers, and confidential execution that does not turn every sale into a signal of distress. When lenders, LPs and founders can see where a loan would really trade, the argument over which default rate is right becomes far less important. The market will already have answered it.
#PrivateCredit #VentureDebt #Secondaries
Bruce Bendell is an investor in startups and private companies and a five-decade operator in the automotive industry. Follow him on LinkedIn.