LIQUIDITY & EXITS
Venture portfolios look healthier on paper than they have in years, but the cash flowing back to the people who funded them is near historic lows. The gap between the two is where private markets need to grow up.
Key takeaways
- PitchBook puts average DPI for 2021 vintage venture funds at 0.05x after five years, the lowest this century.
- Distributions relative to NAV are 7.9%, against a 14.5% long run average, even as exit activity recovers.
- Secondaries are growing fast overall, but venture secondaries remain small and concentrated in a handful of names.
The Number That Pays the Bills
Every venture fund reports two kinds of performance. The first is what the portfolio is worth on paper. The second is what has actually been paid back in cash. The industry calls the second one DPI, distributions to paid-in capital. A DPI of 1.0x means investors have received back every dollar they put in.
Paper value is an estimate. DPI is a fact. And right now the two are telling very different stories.
PitchBook’s latest research puts the average DPI for 2021 vintage venture funds at 0.05x after five years, the lowest five-year figure this century. Put plainly, the typical fund raised at the top of the last cycle has returned about five cents in cash for every dollar its investors committed. The rest is still marks.
Exits Are Back. Cash Is Not.
This is not a story of a frozen market. PitchBook’s Q3 2026 venture analysis shows exit value and exit count both running above their long-term trend lines, helped by the largest venture-backed IPO on record. Yet in the same report, fund distributions relative to net asset value sit at 7.9 percent, against a long run average of 14.5 percent.
How can both be true? Concentration. PitchBook has noted that four companies accounted for 93.5 percent of 2026 exit value earlier this year. A handful of giant exits lifts the totals while the typical fund waits. PitchBook also tracks 110 companies that looked ready to go public in 2023 and are still private today. Since 2022, according to PitchBook, net cash flow to venture investors has been negative by roughly $202 billion, even as reported asset values kept rising.
For anyone who ran a real business, this is familiar territory. Profit on the income statement is pleasant. Cash in the bank is what keeps the doors open.
The Consequences Ripple Outward
When distributions slow, limited partners cannot recycle capital into new funds. Pensions, endowments and family offices have fixed allocations to private markets, and unrealized gains still count against those limits. So they commit less, and they commit it to the managers they trust most.
PitchBook reports that the ten largest venture funds captured 57.6 percent of all capital raised in the first half of 2026, the highest concentration on record. That is rational behavior for each individual LP, but the collective result is a thinner market for emerging managers and, eventually, fewer investors writing checks to early-stage founders outside the most crowded themes.
The pressure reaches founders and employees too. When funds cannot return cash, they hold positions longer, reserve more capital for existing companies and become more cautious about new ones. Employees sit on equity they cannot spend for a decade or more. Everyone in the chain is waiting for the same event, and very few have any say over when it arrives.
Liquidity is not a back-office issue. It decides who gets funded next.
A Release Valve, Not Yet a Pipe
Secondaries, where existing investors sell fund stakes or company shares to new buyers, are the obvious answer. And they are growing quickly. Evercore counts a record $121 billion of secondary volume in the first half of 2026. PitchBook estimates direct secondary trading in venture-backed company shares at about $107 billion over the trailing twelve months, up from around $50 billion seven quarters earlier.
Look closer, though, and the picture is uneven. Evercore puts venture fund secondaries at only about $5 billion in the first half, flat on the year, a small slice of a market dominated by buyout funds. PitchBook describes the direct market as top-heavy, concentrated in a few famous names. For the typical position in the typical fund, there is still no obvious buyer and no obvious price.
The reasons are practical. Venture stakes are small, transfer rules are restrictive, information about portfolio companies is patchy and there are few transaction benchmarks to tell a seller whether a bid is fair. Every trade starts almost from scratch.
Building the Pipe
I do not think the answer is to wait for the IPO window to fix everything. Public listings will come back in waves, and they will always favor the largest companies. The rest of the market needs a standing route to liquidity that does not depend on the calendar.
That route looks like infrastructure, not heroics: continuous price discovery built from real trades, discreet matching between motivated sellers and vetted buyers who understand the asset, and confidential execution that protects both sides. When an LP can see a credible price for a stake without broadcasting the need to sell, paper gains start turning into cash, capital recycles into new funds and the whole system breathes again. Venture has spent a decade perfecting how to get in. The next decade belongs to whoever builds a better way out.
For investors evaluating managers today, that shift is already visible. The questions have moved from how much a portfolio is marked at to how much of it can be turned into cash, at what discount and through what channel. Those are market structure questions, and they deserve market structure answers.
#Secondaries #Liquidity #VentureCapital
Bruce Bendell is an investor in startups and private companies and a five-decade operator in the automotive industry. Follow him on LinkedIn.